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DLD-135        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1107 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 TERRANCE MANUEL, 
   Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 07-cr-00177) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 10, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, FISHER AND ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  May 3, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Terrance Manuel appeals pro se from the order of the District Court denying what 
it apparently construed as a motion for sentencing relief.  We will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings. 
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I. 
 In 2008, Manuel was convicted of four federal crimes, including possession with 
intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B).  The District Court sentenced him below the 
Sentencing Guidelines range to a term of 271 months in prison.  We affirmed his 
conviction, see United States v. Manuel, 342 F. App’x 844, 848 (3d Cir. 2009), and the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, see Manuel v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
258 (2010). 
 Manuel mailed the motion at issue here to the District Court shortly before the 
denial of certiorari, and it arrived after that ruling.  Manuel captioned the motion as a 
“Motion to Supplement Brief or Leave to Supplement Proceeding Regarding the Newly 
Enacted 18:1 Ration [sic].”  Manuel asserted that he was still on certiorari review and 
asked the District Court to “take into consideration” two claims.  First, he asserted that he 
is eligible for relief under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which increased the amount 
of crack cocaine that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(B).  See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 2010).  Second, 
he asserted that he is eligible for relief under the related Amendment 748 to U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(c), which decreased the base offense level applicable to offenses involving crack 
cocaine.  See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Supp. to 2010 Guidelines Manual, 
Amend. 748 (2010).  The District Court directed the Government to respond to the 
motion, which it did on the merits.  Manuel then sent the District Court a letter, in which 
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he requested counsel and clarified that “I have not asked for any type of reduction or 
anything just to supplement my brief so far.”  By order entered January 4, 2011, the 
District Court concluded that Manuel’s claims lack merit and denied his motion with 
prejudice.  Manuel appeals.  We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
 
II. 
 Manuel never affirmatively sought relief on the merits of his claims.  Instead, the 
only relief he requested was leave to supplement his “brief” on direct appeal 
(presumably, his certiorari petition).  The District Court nevertheless denied his claims 
with prejudice.  The District Court did not specify the procedural mechanism under 
which it construed Manuel as proceeding or the basis for its jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of his claims.   
If Manuel had mentioned only Amendment 748 to the Sentencing Guidelines, then 
we might be inclined to construe his motion in the first instance as one for a sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Manuel’s reference to the Fair Sentencing Act, 
however, renders this approach problematic.  A claim seeking retroactive application of 
the Fair Sentencing Act may not be cognizable on a motion for a sentence reduction.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (authorizing certain reductions “based on a sentencing range that 
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission”).  Although we do not 
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 The District Court’s order also denied Manuel’s request for counsel.  Manuel has not 
argued that the District Court abused its discretion in that regard and, in light of our 
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decide the issue, such a claim may be cognizable, if at all, only by means of a habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or a motion attacking the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.   
Treating Manuel’s motion as either type of filing would have various 
consequences.  Treating it as a § 2241 petition could subject any future § 2241 petition he 
might file to dismissal as an abuse of the writ.  See Zayas v. INS, 311 F.3d 247, 256-57 
(3d Cir. 2002).  And treating it as a § 2255 motion would subject any future § 2255 
motion he might wish to file to the provisions restricting the filing of a “second or 
successive” motion.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  For that reason, district courts must provide 
notice to pro se litigants before characterizing their filings as § 2255 motions and 
reaching the merits.  See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003); United States 
v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1999).  The District Court did not issue any such 
notice in this case.  Treating Manuel’s motion as one under § 2255 also would implicate 
our jurisdiction, because Manuel could not then appeal unless the District Court or we 
issued a certificate of appealability.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
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 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Manuel’s claims on 
the merits and remand for further proceedings.  In that regard, we note that the only relief 
Manuel ever requested was to supplement his “brief” on direct appeal.  Because his direct 
                                                                                                                                                             
disposition, we need not address the issue. 
2
 Manuel evidently intends to file an actual § 2255 motion.  In his letter to the District 
Court, he asked “is my 2255 time running” and requested transcripts of his trial and 
sentencing, which the District Court has provided. 
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appeal had concluded by the time his motion reached the District Court, the District 
Court may wish to simply treat the motion on its own terms and dismiss it as moot.  The 
District Court may also wish to ascertain whether Manuel affirmatively seeks relief and 
determine in the first instance the proper procedural mechanism for doing so.  We 
appreciate the District Court’s willingness to liberally construe Manuel’s pro se filing, 
and we have no reason to question its resolution of the merits.
3
  For the reasons explained 
above, however, we will remand for further proceedings.  Manuel’s motion for the 
appointment of counsel on appeal is denied.   
                                                 
3
 The District Court determined that Manuel is not eligible for relief under 
Amendment 748 on the sole ground that the Sentencing Commission has not made it 
retroactive.  For informational purposes, we note that such a conclusion ordinarily 
should result in a dismissal without prejudice rather than a dismissal with prejudice.  
See United States v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44, 53 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Wise, 
515 F.3d 207, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). 
